Deconstruction's emphasis on the proliferation of meanings
is related to the deconstructive concept of iterability. Iterability is
the capacity of signs (and texts) to be repeated in new situations
and grafted onto new contexts. Derrida's aphorism "iterability
alters" (Derrida 1977) means that the insertion of texts into new
contexts continually produces new meanings that are both partly
different from and partly similar to previous understandings.
(Thus, there is a nested opposition between them.). The term
"play" is sometimes used to describe the resulting instability in
meaning produced by iterability
is related to the deconstructive concept of iterability. Iterability is
the capacity of signs (and texts) to be repeated in new situations
and grafted onto new contexts. Derrida's aphorism "iterability
alters" (Derrida 1977) means that the insertion of texts into new
contexts continually produces new meanings that are both partly
different from and partly similar to previous understandings.
(Thus, there is a nested opposition between them.). The term
"play" is sometimes used to describe the resulting instability in
meaning produced by iterability
Although deconstructive arguments show that conceptual
oppositions are not fully stable, they do not and cannot show that
all such oppositions can be jettisoned or abolished, for the principle
of nested opposition suggests that a suppressed conceptual
opposition will usually reappear in a new guise. Moreover,
although all conceptual oppositions are potentially deconstructible
in theory, not all are equally incoherent or unhelpful in practice.
Rather, deconstructive analysis studies how the use of conceptual
oppositions in legal thought has ideological effects: how their
instability or fuzziness is disguised or suppressed so that they lend
unwarranted plausibility to legal arguments and doctrines. Because
all legal distinctions are potentially deconstructible, the question
when a particular conceptual opposition or legal distinction is just
or appropriate turns on pragmatic considerations. Hence,
deconstructive arguments and techniques often overlap with and
may even be in the service of other approaches, such as
pragmatism, feminism or critical race theory.
Deconstruction began to have influence in the legal
academy with the rise of critical legal studies and feminism.
However, deconstructive scholarship eventually became part of an
emerging category of postmodern jurisprudence separate from
critical legal studies.
Deconstructive arguments in feminism have been
more clearly understood as a development and critique of earlier
feminist themes; they are best studied in the context of feminist
jurisprudence. This difference may have something to do with the
continuing vitality of feminism and the waning influence of critical
legal studies at the end of the 1980's.
oppositions are not fully stable, they do not and cannot show that
all such oppositions can be jettisoned or abolished, for the principle
of nested opposition suggests that a suppressed conceptual
opposition will usually reappear in a new guise. Moreover,
although all conceptual oppositions are potentially deconstructible
in theory, not all are equally incoherent or unhelpful in practice.
Rather, deconstructive analysis studies how the use of conceptual
oppositions in legal thought has ideological effects: how their
instability or fuzziness is disguised or suppressed so that they lend
unwarranted plausibility to legal arguments and doctrines. Because
all legal distinctions are potentially deconstructible, the question
when a particular conceptual opposition or legal distinction is just
or appropriate turns on pragmatic considerations. Hence,
deconstructive arguments and techniques often overlap with and
may even be in the service of other approaches, such as
pragmatism, feminism or critical race theory.
Deconstruction began to have influence in the legal
academy with the rise of critical legal studies and feminism.
However, deconstructive scholarship eventually became part of an
emerging category of postmodern jurisprudence separate from
critical legal studies.
Deconstructive arguments in feminism have been
more clearly understood as a development and critique of earlier
feminist themes; they are best studied in the context of feminist
jurisprudence. This difference may have something to do with the
continuing vitality of feminism and the waning influence of critical
legal studies at the end of the 1980's.
